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trial tactics

The Right Objection
By Stephen A. Saltzburg

L

awyers are expected—indeed required—to
make the right objection to evidence offered at trial if they expect to win an evidence fight and to preserve an issue for appeal in
the event they lose the fight at trial. In most instances, the right objection is obvious, especially
to experienced counsel, and the real challenge is
to raise it timely and clearly. But, there are cases
in which crafting the right objection can be tricky.

An Illustrative Case

United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir.
2010), is an example of a case in which choosing
the right objection was more difficult than in the
mine-run case. Terry Davis had been the national
treasurer of the Phi Beta Sigma fraternity. He was
charged with 10 counts of bank fraud, one count
of first-degree theft, and one count of first-degree
fraud. A jury acquitted him on two bank fraud
counts and convicted him on all the other counts.
The fraternity was founded at Howard University in 1914 and over the years developed university and alumni chapters with more than 120,000
members who pay annual dues that are deposited
in a general fund bank account and are used to
pay the fraternity’s operating expenses. Davis was
an elected, unpaid officer of the fraternity. In order
to ensure that the fraternity’s funds were properly
used, the fraternity had a policy that the fraternity’s executive director, its national president, and
the national treasurer must each sign a voucher
authorizing each payment, and the president and
treasurer each must co-sign every fraternity check.
Davis disregarded these policies and wrote checks
without obtaining approved vouchers. Some
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checks contained only his signature, and he signed
or stamped the president’s name on other checks.
When the fraternity investigated financial irregularities and discovered what Davis had done,
it suspended him and installed a new treasurer.
The new treasurer found at least $29,000 in checks
that had been made out to “cash” that was not
deposited in the fraternity’s bank account. These
checks gave rise to the prosecution.

The Defense

Davis’s defense was that the checks he had made
payable to cash were deposited into his personal
banking account and used to pay fraternity bills
and to reimburse himself for fraternity debts he
had incurred using his personal funds. Although
it might seem strange that Davis would write
checks to cash and then turn around to use the
money to pay fraternity expenses rather than pay
them directly from the fraternity bank account,
Davis testified that some vendors and banks were
wary of dealing directly with the fraternity. Davis
claimed that the fraternity had such a poor financial history that some vendors would not accept
a fraternity check and that the fraternity’s bank
denied access to newly deposited funds while a
check cleared, which delayed payment of the fraternity’s overdue bills. Davis explained that, in order to deal with the fraternity’s financial problems,
he would (1) write a fraternity check to cash; (2)
deposit the check in his personal account; (3) either write a personal check or use the proceeds to
purchase a money order; and (4) remit the check
or money order to a vendor, a separate fraternity
bank account, or to a fraternity officer entitled to
reimbursement of expenses.

The Corroborative Witness and the
Evidence Objection

The witness upon whom Davis depended to corroborate his testimony was his wife, Rhonda Davis. The court of appeals described her testimony
as follows:
Rhonda testified that she saw her husband
working at home on fraternity business “on
a very regular basis every day, most of [the]
time, in some way, shape or form.” Asked
about the “types of things” she saw him doing, she replied that “I would see him working on his computer with spreadsheets. I
would—I would even help him mail things.
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I would see the money orders that had to
be processed. I would wait for the Fed. Ex.
man.” Defense counsel later asked Rhonda
to elaborate further: “You talked about seeing Mr. Davis make payments for fraternity
expenses. Can you tell me a specific instance
when you saw him make a payment for a
fraternity expense?” After she responded
“Yes, I can,” the prosecutor objected.
(596 F.3d at 855.)

pany PEPCO, neither of which served her
household. She did not claim to have seen
Davis using money orders for any particular
vendor other than The Hartford.
(Id.)

The government objected that Rhonda Davis
lacked personal knowledge as to the reasons that
Terry Davis wrote checks and made payments and
that, in essence, she was merely repeating hearsay
statements by Terry. The government conceded
that Rhonda could testify from personal knowledge that she saw her husband receive bills, write
checks, and purchase money orders, but argued
that any testimony about the nature of the documents and their purpose should be excluded under Rule 403 as speculative and prejudicial.
The trial judge apparently thought the evidence
issue was more difficult than most such issues and
took up the government’s objection in a hearing
the day after the government raised its objection.
Both sides filed written memoranda and the trial
judge and counsel questioned Rhonda out of the
jury’s presence. Rhonda’s testimony focused on
checks, money orders, and fraternity bills that she
saw. The court of appeals described the testimony
that occurred out of the jury’s hearing:

The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered
for its truth and generally bar its admission
into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802.
The Rules also prohibit a witness from testifying unless he has personal knowledge of
the subject of his testimony. Fed. R. Evid.
602. These provisions intersect if a witness
satisfies Rule 602’s personal knowledge requirement by relying on the truth of an outof-court statement. “If the testimony of the
witness purports to repeat an out-of-court
statement, hearsay is the proper objection.
If the testimony on its face purports to be
based on direct perception of the facts described but is actually based on an out-ofcourt statement about those facts, the objection should be lack of personal knowledge.”
* * * (Citations omitted.)
(596 F.3d at 856.)

Rhonda stated that she saw Davis write
checks to pay fraternity bills and expenses.
But she could only recall one check that
Davis wrote from his personal checking account to pay a fraternity bill. Asked how she
knew this check was for a fraternity expense,
she said her husband told her the check was
“for fraternity stuff.” The court also asked
Rhonda how she knew Davis was using
money orders to pay fraternity bills. She recalled asking Davis about the money orders
“the very first time” she saw them at their
home. He told her he used money orders to
pay fraternity bills because some vendors
would not accept the fraternity’s checks.
Rhonda also testified on voir dire that she
and her husband did not use money orders
to pay household expenses, and that she saw
bills from The Hartford and the utility com-

The trial judge ultimately sustained the government’s objection. The court of appeals noted
the relationship between the personal knowledge
and hearsay rules:

The court added in a footnote that “[b]ecause
the distinction between the two objections is
based only on the form of the testimony, an objection invoking either rule is sufficient.” (Id. at
n.2.) The footnote is almost certainly problematic, since a hearsay objection would generally not
suffice to cover a witness’s testimony that involves
speculation rather than reliance on a declarant’s
statements. It does highlight, however, the way
in which hearsay and personal knowledge objections may relate to one another.

Appellate Resolution

The court ruled that Rhonda’s testimony about
the one check she claimed to see her husband
write to pay a fraternity bill was hearsay because
she relied upon her husband’s out-of-court statement regarding the purpose of the check. This
analysis seems correct.
The court also recognized that generally
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checks, bills, and money orders are not hearsay.
They are not true or false. “They are legally operative documents with a meaning independent
of the truth of the words they display. . . . A $100
money order made out to The Hartford instructs
a financial institution to disburse $100 to The
Hartford. It would make no sense to ask whether
the money order was true.” (Id. at 856-57.)
But, the court held that the trial judge did
not err in excluding some of Rhonda’s testimony about the money orders because on voir dire
she said that she relied upon three things to determine that the money orders were used to pay
fraternity bills: (1) she saw money orders that her
husband wrote to a vendor; (2) she and her husband did not use money orders for household expenses; and (3) her husband responded to a question she asked about the money orders and said
they were for fraternity bills. The court reasoned
that “[t]o the extent Rhonda’s knowledge derived
from what Davis told her, rather than from the
practice of her household or the words written
on the money orders, the district court properly
excluded her proposed testimony regarding the
money orders.” (Id. at 857.)
The court’s reasoning is again correct. Rhonda
should have been permitted to testify as to (1) and (2)
without any hearsay problem but not (3) because (3)
simply relayed a hearsay statement from her husband.
As for the bills, the court rejected Davis’s argument
that Rhonda should have been able to testify to what
she saw and stated that the documents contained
assertions—i.e., the sender and recipient labels—and
the labels asserted facts that could be characterized as
true or false. This analysis appears strained. Surely it
was relevant that Davis had bills purporting to have
been sent to the fraternity from a vendor. He testified to such bills and Rhonda’s testimony that she
saw bills such as he described should have been admissible to corroborate his version of events rather
than for the truth of the matters stated on the bills.
The court distinguished cases in which documents
were shown to be in a certain location and were not
hearsay when used to prove a connection with an individual and insisted that Rhonda’s testimony relied
on the truth of the sender and recipient labels. Although a hindsight analysis demonstrates that there
was a clear nonhearsay purpose for Rhonda’s testimony, the court’s failure to recognize this purpose is
explained by “defense counsel’s failure to articulate a
justification for Rhonda’s proposed testimony independent of the labels’ truth.” (Id. at 858.)

What About Best Evidence?

Although Rhonda’s testimony about the labels
clearly could have been nonhearsay, it would have
raised a best evidence problem had the government made a best evidence objection. After all,
Rhonda was trying to prove the contents of each
bill. That triggers Fed. R. Evid. 1002. The court
of appeals noted this in a footnote:
The policy underlying the best evidence
rule, embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
1002, appeared to animate the district court’s
judgment regarding Rhonda’s proposed testimony. In requiring litigants to prove the
contents of a writing by introducing the writing itself, the rule guards against inaccuracy,
fraud, and incompleteness. . . . Rhonda’s testimony regarding documents not introduced
at trial would have raised these concerns. But
the best evidence rule also affords litigants an
opportunity to demonstrate that admission
of secondary evidence is necessary because
the writing itself is unavailable. Fed. R. Evid.
1004. Because the government never made a
best evidence objection, Davis was not called
upon to produce the bills, checks, and money
orders, although the court suggested that he
should have done so.

Lessons

1. Counsel must make the right objection at
trial. At times, it is unclear whether the right
objection is lack of personal knowledge or
hearsay. Davis suggests that either objection
will do, but reliance on the footnote that
says so is dangerous. When in doubt, prudent counsel would do better to raise both
objections.
2. When a hearsay objection is made, the proponent of evidence bears a burden of demonstrating that the evidence is offered for a
purpose other than its truth. Failure to do
so may result in exclusion of evidence that
might have been admitted. Davis illustrates
this point with respect to the bills.
3. When testimony is offered to prove the contents of documents, there may be a best evidence problem even if there is no hearsay
problem. Davis also illustrates this, although
it is impossible to know whether Davis could
have circumvented a best evidence objection
given that none was made. n
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